Pilot Interim Review,
Nov 1999
continued...
7. Monitoring technique
One of the points we put to some corporate participants was: 'What do you want from the ETI - technique or credibility ?' Although this polarity ignores an important third dimension - the desire to learn about working in unknown or difficult political environments - the question is not completely invalid. The responses tended to be towards wanting the ETI to offer a means of obtaining credibility for their programmes through independent verification of monitoring procedures. The implication was that companies could probably resolve the issue of inspection technique themselves. This view is problematic and overly restrictive, given the experience of the pilots.
Firstly, it remains to be seen which approaches 'worked best' once measured up against the current ETI benchmark, the Principles of Implementation. Since not all the pilots have been wrapped up there remain some unanswered questions.
Some initial points suggest the following:
- Inspections carried out directly by ETI member companies or
by certification companies were undertaken quickly and in line with anticipated
schedules. However, these have not been accompanied by an independent component
to the monitoring, which may raise broader questions of technique - in
particular how workers were interviewed.
- There has been mixed experience using academics and
academic institutions. Locating an individual has proved difficult in China,
although the process might be on the verge of being unblocked. In Zimbabwe and
South Africa academics have been used in various stages of the process, with
varying results - some positive. There are doubts about whether academics can
do more than offer baseline studies and information unless they have specific
training as social auditors.
- NGO component has varied by country. In Zimbabwe, the NGO
element has been crucial in leading the process and developing inspection
methodologies - with others. In China the process has been much more difficult,
in part because of political conditions but also because of the lack of NGO
partners with capacity or interest in ethical trading concerns.
- The ETI corporate component is generally regarded as having
worked reasonably well, and in some cases with exemplary commitment. The
questions raised within the stocktake have concerned: the capacity of smaller
firms to participate, the capacity of corporate champions to win resources and
how ETI might help in this or offset problems through mutual help, worries that
the desire to sustain good trading relationships with suppliers might blunt the
drive to pursue compliance with codes, and the need to engage senior trading
personnel at an initial stage.
- The trade union component has not functioned optimally
everywhere for a variety of reasons, many of which are not amenable to action
by ETI member trade unions. There was a call to support unions locally on
capacity building. In China, there is a fundamental problem of freedom of
association, which both creates the main issue from the point of view of trade
union based NGOs but also makes work on the ground especially difficult. In
Zimbabwe, there is reported scepticism on the part of the local union about
codes, an issue about allocation of resources to this work, and some
difficulties in engaging in activity on the ground. Trade union membership is
quite low in the examples chosen - 5-7% of the relevant workforce - raising
issues of the ability of unions to deliver local capacity and financial
resources. In some cases, not in these pilots, there were also concerns about
credibility where unions are divided on political grounds or where there is a
multiplicity of unions. Finally, although it was said that 'unions have another
agenda', it could equally well be said that local non-unionised suppliers may
wish to thwart unionisation. The fact that the ETI is seeking to run on a
multi-stakeholder basis should not obscure the fact that relations locally
might be adversarial. This problem will be heightened where unions are either
sceptical about codes or see them solely as an entry point for organising.
- The official component again has had mixed fortunes. It worked well in South Africa, facilitated by long standing positive relationships between the TUC and ANC. South Africa also has a highly developed and rapidly developing labour legislation, an emerging labour administration and inspectorate, is democratic and has a strong national trade union movement. In China, there were initial difficulties due to the mixed advice given to the ETI: this may be resolved, using direct approach and local UK official representatives, but there is some distance to travel, and the state apparatus will not be transparent. In Zimbabwe, the role of local government and in particular of national officially-supported tripartite industrial relations arrangements was viewed positively.
There is likely to be some trade-off between effectiveness and efficiency which ETI members may need to come to a consensus about. This may embrace issues such as the duration of an inspection and the number of people involved, their stakeholder origin, and time spent on site. One farmer raised the desirability of having 'yes and no' questions, in contrast to more open questions. It would useful for ETI to work towards guidelines on what suppliers can expect in terms of on-site times per auditor and auditors per facility.
Corporate members and suppliers made clear that to be acceptable over the long term monitoring procedures must be:
- replicable,
- cost-effective and not too demanding of other resources, [13]
- non-disruptive to retailers' and suppliers' operations, [14]
- beneficial and not prejudicial to an individual suppliers' competitive position,
- conducted by personnel with no external agenda,
- amenable to being granted external credibility.
These criteria tend to favour internal or 2nd party monitoring, but at the cost of access to information which might only be available to wholly independent monitors. However, organising an independent constituent to monitoring has raised major difficulties in some cases, and the learning on this is not yet over. Key issues have been:
- identification of partners, communicating ETI's approach and priorities, agreeing local actions - some of the proposals for preparing pilots and offering more guidance on the Base Code might mitigate some of these difficulties in future,
- in particular, there are problems about agreeing common agendas.
Even if solved in principle, organising such an input could raise major problems in practice if inspections were scaled up to embrace dozens or hundreds of suppliers within a sector or country. This is the perspective facing the pilot in Zimbabwe. It raises the questions of: how to build capacity and who pays?
Secondly, companies may have - and do have - differing ideas about technique: whilst some of these reflect different corporate priorities and possibilities, others might simply be inconsistent, and may not, on closer examination, match ETI agreed principles.
Thirdly, companies are at very different levels of development in terms of technique. In some cases, this is a function of the time involved, in others resources. Where possible, the ETI needs to act as a resource for transmitting good practice, and be able to adduce the minimum requirements for ensuring that the Principles of Implementation were fulfilled. This brought up the question again of whether ETI was always working at the right level, and that steps needed to be taken to ensure that high-level commitment was made and followed up, especially in the early stages of membership. It was proposed that the ETI should hold an event ('cocktail party') to realise this.
7.1 Positive lessons on monitoring
The pilots themselves have thrown up many positive lessons for good practice. In general, it was felt that technical staff visiting suppliers needed to be able to sing from the same hymn sheet and co-ordinate with social auditors.
The following points are a mixture of observed good practice carried out during inspections and recommendations by participants or working group members based on feed back from inspections. They include:
- developing a profile of the facility or workplace ahead of visits (by a preliminary visit): this may embrace some of the issues raised below.
- identifying the actors in a workplace who exercise operational control over key aspects of employment, such as recruitment and allocation of overtime.
- understanding cultural norms on a range of issues: for example, issues and priorities on terms and conditions, how information is distributed in a workplace.
- important role of labour migration in all the pilots - and hence the need for improved methodologies on housing conditions and housing tenure.
- the need to tighten up on analysis of health and safety issues, and to ensure that health and safety specialists with experience in the industries in focus are available.
- importance of operationalising codes in a way which allows issues to be tackled not in order of the principles but by worker category - development of modules which can be shuffled at short notice for ease of use.
- need to submit documentary check-lists ahead of visit to save time on-site.
- need to unpack the notion of 'living wage' and assess importance and desirability of payment-in-kind and/or the benefits package.
- ideas on best practice for interviewing workers, not all of which may be consistent at present but give food for thought (confidentiality, single interviews with some workers off-site because of worries about focus groups, interviews with other household members, points to which whistleblowers could report).
These issues are complex and there is more feedback than can useful be included here. We therefore argue that they should pulled together into a 'Monitoring Technique' workbook. Such a workbook could also draw on the wealth of experience available from company practice not within the pilots, from the wealth of knowledge of ETI members who have looked at these issues over several years and from the broader literature. A workbook of this type, which would be subject to development and revision, would constitute an ETI resource to attract and retain corporate members.
7.2 Terminology
There still seem to be considerable differences of understanding on terminology used to describe inspection, monitoring and verification. It would be useful for there to be agreement at least within the ETI on this. Several proposals for clarification were circulated in the run-up to the pilots. However, they are not completely consistent with the ETI Principles of Implementation. Problems seem to occur in particular when ETI vocabulary meets the certification companies.
To cite two examples of different understandings: 'auditing' and 'verification'.
In the former case, 'auditing' is often used by certification companies to describe a plant visit (which might be termed 'inspection' in the terms used in the pilots). However, 'auditing' has also been used to refer to 'an external check that the systems and procedures adopted by the company and the supplier are fit to meet the stated aims', and is distinguished from 'verification'.
In the latter case, individuals with an 'auditing' [!] background refer to the verification of documentary claims against physical assets, or the verification of verbal claims against documentary proof. 'Verification' has also been used by ETI members to mean 'independent checks that the inspection and follow-up actions are in accordance with reports compiled by the company'. 'Independent verification' in the ETI Principles is undefined, but is distinguished from 'monitoring' and seems to be close to the definition of 'auditing' cited above.
8. Reports, feedback and corrective action
There was a strong feeling amongst some pilot participants (and suppliers) that no more than one day should be spent conducting an inspection, and that rapid feedback needed to be given to suppliers. This raised the question as to the stage at which corrective action and priorities should be determined. For example:
- Should a summary feedback be given, but with the ultimate
decision on requests for corrective action left to the retailer(s) in question?
- Can a 2nd party monitor be empowered to identify breaches
and request corrective action without going back to the client?
- If there is in-house monitoring (as proposed by one farmer in Zimbabwe) with 'pro-active' steps to comply with the Code, would all facilities need to be externally verified to secure recognition of compliance?
The question was also raised as to how feedback should be given to employees and/or employee representatives.
It may be that the section of the Principles of Implementation on 'Corrective Actions' needs to be translated into more constructive language which can be given to suppliers - whilst retaining the spirit of the last sentence: 'where serious breaches of the code persist, [ETI members are committed] to terminate any business relationship with the supplier concerned'. This also presupposes agreement on what a 'serious breach' is. [15]
However, ETI concerns have evidently been passed on where feedback has been given, and in some cases remedial action was taken. In Zimbabwe, for example, employees were given copies of their contracts of employment; and steps were taken to ensure that an administrative employee was on hand to explain the make-up of pay and deductions on the individual's pay slip.
Report back from Zimbabwe indicated that suppliers also wanted a quantitative assessment of problems discovered during the inspection, with implications for the resources which would need to be dedicated - and how quickly - to remedying them). This ties in with the issue of defining 'serious breaches' in terms of the ETI Code.
Moving to a more standardised form of reporting would seem to be an urgent requirement if pilots/monitoring are to be scaled up, and reports acquire credibility. This is also closely tied to the design and content of audit schedules.
9. Verification
The issue of verification is fundamental to the future of the ETI and a core element in the commitments which all stakeholders make in becoming members. [16]
So far, the pilots have only barely begun to tackle the question of independent verification, despite the fact that all corporate participants stressed the need to find answers and the fact that they could not acquire the credibility they needed on their own or via 2nd party monitoring. In some cases it was reported that no credible body was on the immediate horizon. More positively, the report back from Zimbabwe offered many hopeful signs as to how a locally-owned, multi-stakeholder monitoring regime might develop and seek external verification - from ETI.
Stakeholders have different demands on independent verification, an issue comprehensively explored in the document 'Open Trading'. Corporate members reported that this was a centrepiece of their interest in the ETI.
Verification and monitoring techniques are intimately connected. If a monitoring regime is unsatisfactory because of its methodology, it cannot subsequently be given a clean bill of health, irrespectively of how scrupulously it has been implemented. Resolving issues of technique may, therefore, have a bearing on how the ETI moves on to address verification. It is also, therefore, important that the detailed lessons on technique learnt in the pilots should be compiled, disseminated and, if necessary, agreed by all sides as a basis for offering a monitoring process which will clear the minimum hurdle of being accepted as a basis for a 'verifiable standard'.
It is also important to establish with suppliers that their facility might be visited by independents. Whether such a visit would take place will depend on agreements reached in the ETI on verification procedures, and in particular on sampling and on what basis such independents might present themselves (period of advanced notice etc.). This has not yet been an issue in the pilots as none has yet moved far enough on. However, it is likely to be an issue soon in Zimbabwe if plans are realised to roll-out a monitoring regime to 500 farms.
The issue of sampling is of key importance here in various respects.
- What lessons can be learnt from social science methodologies on acceptable sample sizes for different sorts of populations?
- Sampling is not just a technical issue - it also depends on agreement on what is acceptable to all sides and feasible. What positive and negative experiences of this can ETI draw on?
The next stage is to locate responsibility within the ETI for setting up a verification regime in each pilot.
This also raises a number of paradoxes which need clarification.
If monitoring has an NGO or trade union input, can these same organisations locally also conduct independent verification of company monitoring processes and examine a sample of completed inspections? If not, who? One proposal from the Zimbabwe pilot is for the 'ETI' to carry out independent verification (sometimes termed an 'audit'). This raises the question as to how the ETI and its (NGO) members could respond to such a request, given that neither wants to be a certification or labelling organisation.
Another possibility floated in Zimbabwe was for verification to be carried out by one of the international standards auditors, such as SGS or BVQI. This, in turn, would be problematic if such auditing organisations were also retained by suppliers as 2nd party auditors of their facilities against the ETI or another agreed code. (The issue of ETI's relationship with certification companies is aired further below).
NGOs and trade unions are both 'suppliers' of independent credibility but also the main parties to demand it. This demand has, to some extent, shifted to the corporate sector which has accepted that monitoring without independent verification is not acceptable.
As both 'supply' and 'demand', it would seem to fall to the NGOs/TUs to tackle the question of how independent verification can be established, since the corporate sector will inevitably be preoccupied with implementation and monitoring. Specifically:
- who are acceptable verifiers (and how should they be trained and certified),
- what best practice can be drawn on to ensure the independence and integrity of verifiers (for example, from the Rugmark initiative),
- can sufficient verification capacity be built up to respond to a substantial scaling up of demand for verification on the ETI,
- where should this capacity be located (an institution in the UK existing under the umbrella of the ETI, a network, in individual NGOs, available directly through the ETI, in local 'Social Accountability Bureaux' etc.?)
- are commercial certification companies acceptable and under what circumstances?
This leads on consideration of the role of commercial social auditing.
10. Private certification companies ('commercial social auditing')
Hiring a certification company has evident advantages for a retailer in terms of efficiency, obtaining standardised results, tapping into extensive expertise and capacity, and holding out the prospect of replicability should a procedure be applied to a large number of suppliers. Although certification companies may not be able to offer precisely the same standard of monitoring everywhere, and may still need to develop competencies in social auditing, the advantages which they can offer - and their desire to capture business - mean that they are a presence which the ETI cannot ignore.
Retailers (and others) in the pilots acknowledged the professionalism of the commercial social auditors, but remain sceptical about accounting companies. It was also noted that certification companies were able to add value by operationalising the Base Code. At the same time, retailers do not want to subject themselves to repeated selling attempts by certification companies, especially if they have not yet arrived at a conclusive view on how they want to manage ethical trading issues.
This raises the question of the appropriate relationship between the ETI, its members, and the certification companies. Moreover, if - as in Zimbabwe - it is possible that certification companies might audit against a code supported by ETI, and in a context in which ETI has set a standard for best practice on monitoring, with ETI ultimately as the agency which would independently verify the overall set up, then should ETI 'technology' be made available to commercial companies. As noted above, a monitoring procedure could fail to be approved (i.e. fail when independently verified), if the technique is deficient. Retailers and certification companies could reasonably ask for detailed guidance from the ETI on how it expects monitoring to be conducted - that is, the disclosure of what is in effect ETI proprietary information gained with the use of members' (and public) money. How should the ETI respond to such a request?
11. Development or risk management?
This recapitulates some of the issues raised at various points above, but raises them separately because there was an undertone of concern in the feedback from the pilots.
The ETI represents a coalition of institutions with a mixture of divergent and convergent interests. The ETI can operate because there is sufficient overlap and mutual interest and need to sustain an organisation. Within the ETI the key driver is the desire of corporate members to remove risks to their reputations and operations from poor employment conditions in their suppliers.
Corporate members have a need to work with NGOs and TUs for two reasons:
- NGOs/TUs have access to information which would not be made available to employers or those directly,
- Only NGOs/TUs have the independence from the corporate sector as such to offer external political credibility - although certification companies may be able to demonstrate independence from individual companies and conduct verification.
It was noted above that there might be a trade-off between a broader developmental approach and a more circumscribed monitoring approach. There are good reasons to suppose that under some circumstances, a developmental approach - which touches on broader social issues and seeks to aid in institution-building - will have the capacity to mobilise wider groups of stakeholders and more resources, including, possibly, official resources. It may also feed into learning, because broader questions can be asked of employees, their families etc. In other words, it is not a straight-line trade-off.
The Base Code also has a developmental content in its section on children, for example, and other developmental goals could probably be read off in other areas to which a commitment has already been made. This may be important in securing official support and co-operation.
However, a developmental approach could raise issues of the boundaries of the suppliers' responsibilities and, by implication, those of ETI corporate members. There is also a danger - raised in this review - that a process which is too ambitious or which has overly political overtones could prejudice corporate involvement in the longer term, or cause companies to flee to a simpler, but possibly less robust, process.
12. Conclusions
Based on the feedback received from pilot participants and reflections on this, we propose the following - grouped in accordance with the original terms of reference.
12.1 Lessons learnt for future monitoring processes
The preparatory phase for pilots should be systematised and a Pilot Protocol developed to help in the set-up and management of pilots. This reflects the fact that the pilots have begun to give ETI the potential to develop proprietary approaches. This would address, amongst other things:
- Baseline study - with identification of employment priorities and gap analysis.
- Stakeholder analysis to identify capacity, partners and relationships. A sign off of the first stage and agreement on the next stages and approaches from ETI to give pilot chairs confidence to proceed.
- Relationship building with key stakeholders, using materials which send a consistent message about ETI and highlight gains from participation.
- Translation of relevant materials into local languages
- Base Code could be augmented with Guidance Notes to help in tackling specific issues, such as definition of a 'living wage'.
- Knowledge drawn from pilots on monitoring could be embodied in a revisable Monitoring Workbook on ETI best practice.
12.2 Design of future pilots
Auditable information
Learning from pilots and elsewhere should be compiled into Guidance Notes
for implementing the Base Code.
In some cases, this might entail expanding on or defining issues in the
Base Code, in others specifying indicators on the ground.
There is also extensive experience inside and outside the ETI on the appropriate ways to conduct worker interviews, feedback from within the pilots which needs to be definitively assessed, and a number of methodologies for sampling within facilities. What might be contentious is reaching agreement within each pilot on ETI requirements on sampling for monitoring and independent verification.
Maximise involvement of key stakeholders - North and
South
Actions could include:
- materials to explain the mission and approach of the ETI,
- better preparation, including using partnership links between Northern organisations and Southern counterparts,
- exploration of how gains to suppliers from improving employment standards could be more systematically presented (factory organisation, lower accident, sickness, absence, and reject rates: however, productivity needs to be treated carefully if improvements merely led to dismissals),
- consideration of establishing institutions to bind stakeholders together, and offer efficiency gains to corporate members in terms of a 'one stop shop' to find monitoring and/or verifying capacity ('Social Accountability Bureaux'). Exploration of prospect for official support on this,
- move beyond the individual factory to try and work at sectoral/regional level, backed up by a developmental component. This helps remove some of the competitive concerns of suppliers.
12.3 The contribution of ETI to best practice on monitoring and verification
The ETI is one of a plethora of initiatives and campaigns in the field of socially-responsible sourcing. As such it has to compete for public attention, offer an acceptable forum for addressing employment standards issues for NGOs and trade unions, and secure credibility amongst corporate members and suppliers. What can the ETI offer to win and retain credibility?
The ETI's current unique attributes are.
- A powerful claim to credibility because of its
multi-stakeholder composition - it is not business-led and controlled, but at
the same time it is translating campaigning objectives into business processes.
Although the benefits of a multi-stakeholder body have already been
demonstrated in the development of the Base Code and the establishment of
inspection regimes in the pilots, the issue of verification has not yet been
tackled systematically.
- The multi-stakeholder character of ETI also allows
improvements in technique, through access to an independent component to
monitoring, feedback on local employment priorities, and access to the broad
experience of all stakeholders in dealing with commercial, employment, social
and development issues.
- The support of Government. This could prove vitally
important in how future programmes are initiated and tackled on the ground. In
turn, Government can benefit from its support for ETI as it can be seen to be
promoting labour standards in a way which avoids the snags of 'social clauses'
in trade agreements.
- It offers neutrality combined with commitment. The ETI is
not a 'rent seeker' and corporate members can feel that they can explore and
learn without being steered towards proprietary solutions.
- It offers an efficient forum for learning, for sharing
information and for networking. In particular, the ETI offers a unique route by
which corporate participants can identify and assess civil society actors with
whom they need to work in order to secure the integrity of inspection
procedures, and obtain external credibility.
- It has a 'development component' which can enlist the support of Government, NGOs and trade unions, as well as corporate participants. This is embodied in those aspects of the Base Code which provide for core labour standards, for the participation of corporate members in policies and programmes to help working children move into education, and in commitments to foster regular employment relationships.
Fully harnessing the ETI's potential will, however, require further action:
- to systematise learning and make the results available in a form which offers incentives to companies to join: this report proposes a Pilot Protocol, Guidance Notes on the Base Code, and a Monitoring Technique Workbook,
- to highlight the efficiency gains, mutual support (especially for smaller companies) and resources accessible through corporate membership of ETI,
- to tackle the issue of verification as a matter of urgency,
- to systematise the process for initiating new programmes - including selection and assessment of co-operating institutions and individuals on the ground,
- to ensure that official support can be deployed constructively on the ground,
- to secure the ETI's long-term future against policy switches.
Some of these points are developed further as proposals for improving internal working methods set out below.
12.4 Changes to internal work methods - dealing with rapid growth in pilots
Scaling up the ETI's activity carries with it the implication that the ETI might move on from being a learning forum and resource to an organisation with a greater operational role in delivering socially-responsible sourcing.
This may be seen as overly ambitious - but the desirability of this needs to be aired. Suppliers may resent being drawn into 'learning processes' from which they stand to gain little. By contrast, some organisations may regard a greater operational role as problematic. At the least, all ETI members ought to have the opportunity to reflect on this as distinct constituencies before the ETI completes the 'pilot' phase and moves onto other programmes.
If the ETI decides to move ahead with more pilots there is much to be said for setting explicit 'strategic' criteria for selecting them. These might include:
- proportion of the overall supplier base accounted for by particular countries/sectors, and the structure of the supply chain [17]
- ease of learning - amenability to arriving at a demonstration effect, and avoiding replicating learning experiences already gained elsewhere,
- identification of capacity among NGOs and TUs and/or official support,
- identification of capacities on the employer side - for example, existence of sectoral institutions which seem to favour the ETI approach,
- need to tackle specific problems on the ground for which the ETI process is especially helpful,
- feasibility.
Proliferation of pilots would have implications for the management and governance of the ETI. Would existing practice on chairing be realistic if 10 pilots were running? If not, who would take the lead role and responsibility in pilots? One interviewee felt that the pilots ought to be chaired by members - not ETI staff, whose task was to facilitate from a position of neutrality. However, a trade union participant said their organisation would run into severe capacity problems if pilots were multiplied. Whether the current approach could be modified by an initial high-level sign-off of the pilot proposal would be for the Board to decide.
The pilots also offer lessons for systematising and streamlining the establishment of pilots: this could be worked on separately as a 'Pilot Protocol', with checklists and critical paths to ease the process in future. Such streamlining could lower the required input of chairs and working group members, and enable meetings to be held less frequently, or be shortened. Greater devolution of responsibility to local stakeholders could mean that London meetings could be reduced in number.
Expanding pilots also inevitably raises the issue of finance, which is beyond the remit of this report.
Finally, there was a recognition of the need for 'consistent and quality support' from the secretariat. It was noted that the secretariat support was now 'excellent' with 'superb' minutes and administration.